

Lexington Police Department

Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

1) OUTSIDE AUDIT. Has the ALPR/Flock program ever been audited by anyone outside the Lexington Police Department — an outside firm, LFUCG's Division of Internal Audit, a Council-commissioned review, or the state auditor? I've found no record of one and the city's audit page lists none, so I want to be certain before I report that.

The Lexington Police Department was one of the first agencies in the country to audit ALPR/Flock search records. During the implementation phase, it was determined that an audit would be conducted by the Intelligence Unit and the Public Integrity Unit. Other outside firms have not conducted an audit due to CJIS Security Policy standards and the integrate knowledge needed of computer aided dispatch records, case management records and the National Crime Information Center (NCIC).

2) THE PIU SAMPLE SIZE. Through Q1 2025, the Public Integrity Unit memos describe using "a random number generator ... to audit 1% of the unique entries" (yielding 87 entries in Q3 2024, 75 in Q4 2024, 89 in Q1 2025). Beginning with Q2 2025, the language changes to "At random 20 of the unique entries for the months ... totaling 60 overall selections," and has read that way since. Why did the method change from a proportional sample to a fixed 60 per quarter?

This change enables PIU to specifically identify entries that could appear irregular as opposed to randomly looking at a proportional sample of overall entries.

3) THE DENOMINATOR. Relatedly: how many "unique entries" is that 60 drawn from in a typical month? I want to be careful here — I understand PIU's "unique entries" is not the same figure as the Intelligence Unit's "unique search reasons," and I don't want to publish a percentage against the wrong denominator.

It varies, but on average a sample of 2900 overall entries are downloaded per month to select from and perform an audit.

4) THE REPEAT-PLATE SCREEN. Quarterly audits from 2024 through Q4 2025 state: "If a search was conducted on a specific plate more than 10 times, further review was conducted." The Q1 2026 audit instead states: "If a plate was searched with more than 7 days between searches, further auditing was competed." Why did that screen change? And is there a current screen that would flag a high volume of searches on a single plate by a single user within a short window?

The change was made to make the audit process capture more data that warranted a second look. News reports in other jurisdictions reported that Officers who were misusing the system were conducting searches over an extended period of time. It was determined that this would be a better method to locate invalid searches.

5) RETENTION. Three different figures appear in the record: the Contract #094-2024 order form lists a "Retention Period: 30 Days"; the 2024 expansion quote prices an "Extended data retention" add-on

1. Two LPD lookups on Saturday, April 18, 2026 — at 10:39 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. EDT — carry the reason "Other - agency assist (ICE)" and searched 2,081 networks nationwide with 11-18). The operator

described as "Up to 1 Year"; and the Q2 2026 audit states "The Lexington Police department stores data for 60 days." Which is operative today, and what is the extended-retention add-on buying?

APLR records are kept for 60 days and then no longer available for inquiry. This time frame was chosen as it provides the ability for a balance between a thorough investigation with not storing data for an extended period.

6) THE MISSING AUDITS. Ten of the 27 documents linked on the audit page return a 404 error — every quarterly audit from Q3 2022 through Q1 2024, the consolidated 2022 audit, and the Q2 2024 quarterly and PIU audits. That is the program's first two years. Can those documents be restored to the page or provided to me directly?

This error is being reviewed and the corrections will be made.

7) OUTSIDE-AGENCY ACCESS. Can an officer from another agency search Lexington-collected plate data through Flock's network? If so, would that search appear in the audits LPD conducts, which as I read them cover this department's own users?

Agencies who are granted access by our department can conduct a search to investigate if a specific vehicle was in Lexington at a specific time frame.

8) THE NEW FLOCK ALERTS. The Q2 2026 audit reports that Flock introduced enhanced auditing at the start of that quarter, including an "Exclusive external network search" alert category. Has that category ever triggered, and what happens when it does?

That alert has never been triggered through the new advanced audit feature introduced by Flock. If the alert was received from an outside agency, sharing with that agency would be suspended while further review was conducted.

1. Two LPD lookups on Saturday, April 18, 2026 — at 10:39 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. EDT — carry the reason "Other - agency assist (ICE)" and searched 2,081 networks nationwide with a seven-day window (April 11–18). The operator name and case number were withheld by the agencies that released the records. Who requested those searches, which ICE component (Enforcement and Removal Operations or Homeland Security Investigations), was the underlying matter a criminal investigation or civil immigration enforcement, and what LPD policy governs running an LPR search at the request of a federal immigration agency? General Order 2022-01 routes outside-agency hot-list requests through the Duty Commander; does the same approval apply to searches run on an outside agency's behalf?

This search was conducted by Lexington Personnel to assist a federal agency with a criminal pick-up order. The wanted subjects were wanted due to their continued gang and drug trafficking involvement which was brought to their attention after a family member was arrested for a local murder.

2. Roughly 84 LPD searches in December 2025 and May 2026 name HSI investigations (fraud, money laundering, wanted persons). Is there a written agreement or task-force arrangement under which LPD runs LPR searches for HSI?

The Lexington Police Department assists federal agents with lawful requests. The Lexington Police Department does not have a task-force arrangement with HSI.

3. In 2025, roughly four in five LPD searches queried 1,000 or more agency networks; in 2026 it is virtually all of them. One search on April 23, 2026 queried 104,930 cameras across 6,391 networks. Is nationwide scope the default setting for LPD users, who approves it, and has the department considered limiting default scope to Kentucky or the region?

Nationwide search was an option that was readily available to Officers which allowed all cameras to be searched. The Lexington Police Department has turned off the Nationwide search feature as we listened to concerns from the community.

4. A single case number (2025024602, a February 2025 shots-fired/wanted-person matter) accounts for roughly 3,700 to 4,000 distinct searches between Feb. 14 and July 25, 2025, nearly all by one user, with up to 469 searches in one day (April 2) — hundreds of searches an evening, typically seconds apart, on the same plate. Was that a scripted or scheduled search, a Flock "Daytime search"/hot-list feature, or manual entry? Did the Public Integrity Unit's quarterly audit flag it?

The search being conducted was not scripted or scheduled. The search was being conducted in an attempt to locate a violent subject and take him into custody for the warrants that had been obtained. The Lexington Police Department choose to not allow Hot List entries for Individual Officers; therefore some Officers will search a record multiple times in an attempt to see if any new information is available. The search was for a legitimate law enforcement purpose as it was an active case. The Subject was eventually located and arrested on July 28th and therefore the searches stopped.

5. More than 4,000 distinct LPD searches carry pasted NCIC/eWarrants text in the reason field — including DOB/, SOC/ (Social Security), OLN/ (license number) and NAM/ fields for wanted persons, and in some cases names of missing children's parents and a homicide suspect's girlfriend. Those reason

strings are transmitted to every agency whose cameras are queried and are being released by those agencies under open-records laws. Is LPD aware of this, and does department guidance address what may be typed into the reason field?

The APLR vendor has changed the information that is shared and this is no longer the case. The Lexington Police Department Policy required sufficient information to determine the reason for the search.

6. Some records show reasons such as "Oct-71" or "1971-10-01" where the officer evidently typed "10-71." Are those artifacts of the receiving agencies' spreadsheets, or of LPD's own exports?

The "Oct-71" and other similarities are a 10-71 search which is for a stolen vehicle.

7. Now that HB 58 (effective July 15, 2026) limits ALPR data sharing to law enforcement "solely for purposes of protecting public safety or conducting criminal investigations," has LPD changed anything about how it handles requests from federal immigration agencies?

All request from outside agencies are vetted to make certain they are legitimate law enforcement reasons.

8. What did I not ask that I should have?